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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
VERA ARLENE FERGUSON, 
vs. 
Plaintiff and 
Appellant, 
LOWELL GENE FERGUSON, 
Defendant and 
Respondent. 
Case No. 14639 
REPLY BRIEF 
Appeal from Judgment of the Third Judicial 
District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah 
The Honorable Stewart Hanson, Jr., Judge 
HAROLD G. CHRISTENSEN 
ELLEN MAYCOCK, of 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Seventh Floor 
Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
and Appellant 
ROGER D. SANDACK, of 
SANDACK & SANDACK 
370 East Fifth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Defendant 
and Respondent 
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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
VERA ARLENE FERGUSON, 
vs. 
Plaintiff and 
Appellant, 
LOWELL GENE FERGUSON, 
Defendant and 
Respondent. 
REPLY BRIEF 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
Case No. 14639 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FOLLOW THE LEGAL PRE-
CEDENTS FROM THIS COURT HOLDING THAT A SUBSEQUENTLY ANNUL-
LED REMARRIAGE DOES NOT TERMINATE THE OBLIGATION TO PAY 
ALIMONY ARISING FROM A FORMER MARRIAGE. 
Defendant bases much of his argument in support 
of the trial court's decision not to award alimony on Utah 
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Code Ann. §30-1-17.2, in which the legislature provided 
that under certain circumstances alimony could be awarded 
after an annulment. However, §30-1-17.2 does not preclude 
an award of alimony in the present case for two reasons: 
First, §30-1-17.2 is silent on the effect on prior alimony 
of an annulled remarriage and second, by its terms, §30-1-
17.2 does not apply to the present case. 
Defendant argues that by enacting §30-1-17.2, 
the legislature sought to overrule the holdings of the 
Utah Supreme Court in Cecil v. Cecil, 11 U.2d 155, 356 P.2d 
279 (1960) and Kent v. Kent, 228 U.2d 34, 497 P.2d 652 
(1972). However, if the legislature wanted to preclude the 
reinstatement of the prior alimony, it could have done so. 
Instead, in §30-1-17.2, the legislature merely provided 
that in some cases alimony could be awarded in an annul-
ment proceeding. Thus, the legislature has not acted with 
respect to a reinstatement of prior alimony. 
Furthermore, §30-1-17.2 provides for an award of 
alimony only under certain circumstances. §30-1-17.2 pro-
vides: 
-2-
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If the parties have accumulated any property or 
acquired any obligations subsequent to the mar-
riage, where there is a genuine need arising 
from economic change of circumstances due to the 
marriage, or if there are children born, or 
expected, the Court may make temporary and final 
orders, and subsequently modify the orders, rela-
ting to the parties, their property and obliga-
tions, the children and their custody and visita-
tion, and the support and maintenance of the 
parties and the children, as may be equitable. 
The children born to the parties after the date 
of the marriage, shall be deemed the legitimate 
children of both parties for all purposes. 
None of these circumstances exist in the present 
case. The parties neither accumulated properties nor 
acquired obligations. The economic circumstances of the 
parties did not change. Nor were children born or expec-
ted. Under §30-1-17.2, then, an award of alimony after 
Mrs. Ferguson's second marriage would not have been proper. 
Defendant argues both that there was a change 
of economic circumstances due to Mrs. Ferguson's remarriage 
(Respondent's Brief, pages 7 and 8) and that there was not 
such a change (Respondent's Brief, pages 8 and 9). In 
fact, the only change of circumstances that occurred during 
the second marriage was the cessation of alimony payments. 
As Mrs. Ferguson was entitled to have those payments rein-
-3-
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stated upon her annulment, there was no change of economic 
circumstances. 
The change in economic circumstances upon which 
Mrs. Ferguson based her request for increased alimony and 
child support were the additional living expenses since 
the divorce from Mr. Ferguson and Mr. Ferguson's ability 
to pay additional sums. 
Defendant also argues that the Cecil and Kent 
cases cited in appellant's brief are factually distinguish-
able in some particulars. But in both cases the issue 
whether alimony from a prior marraige should continue 
after an annulment was squarely presented and in both 
cases, this Court held that alimony should continue. In 
the absence of any contrary precedent, the lower court 
should have ordered payment of alimony. 
Defendant also continues to attempt a collateral 
attack on the annulment (Respondent's Brief, page 10). As 
appellant's original brief points out, this court held in 
Cecil that the annulment may not be collaterally attacked. 
Defendant cites Austead v. Austead, 2 U.2d 49, 
69 P.2d 284 (1954) as authority for the proposition that 
-4-
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Mrs. Ferguson must show exceptional circumstances to 
entitle her to alimony after a remarriage. However, 
Austead did not involve an annulled remarriage and thus 
is not controlling on the issue decided in Cecil and Kent. 
In any event, it may be argued that an annulment is what 
the Utah Supreme Court has regarded as an exceptional cir-
cumstance to entitle Mrs. Ferguson to a reinstatement of 
alimony. 
Although defendant argues that plaintiff has 
not demonstrated a need for alimony,Mrs. Ferguson did 
demonstrate need to the lower court as shown by the fact 
that the court increased the amount of child support to be 
paid. Whether Mrs. Ferguson sought alimony from her 
second husband or whether her second husband had the abil-
ity to pay alimony is irrelevant to the question of Mrs. 
Ferguson's present need for support. This is another 
attempt by defendant to attack the annulment proceeding 
collaterally. 
Defendant complains of the rulings in the court 
below regarding discovery. Plaintiff served interrogatories 
and a request for production of documents on defendant on 
-5-
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June 12, 1975. Defendant failed to respond. On December 
3, 1975, plaintiff moved to compel answers and a response. 
On December 16, 1975, the court ordered defendant to 
respond. Defendant still failed to respond. As a result 
of that failure, on January 8, 1976, the court entered an 
order of sanctions, precluding defendant from offering 
evidence as to his financial status because his financial 
status was the subject of the interrogatories and request 
for production. 
Defendant now attempts to base an argument on 
that preclusion. The order of sanctions was a valid exer-
cise of the court's power to impose sanctions for failure 
to prevent discovery on defendant and defendant should 
not be now permitted to base an argument on that preclusion. 
Defendant also argues that the order of sanctions 
amounted to a default judgment. (Respondent's Brief, page 
18). There is no basis for such an argument. The differ-
ence between precluding defendant from offering proof on 
a certain issue, as to which he refused discovery, and 
the entry of a default are so obvious as not to require 
comment. 
-6-
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The argument that the lower court could not 
award child support and attorney fees in excess of the 
amount sought in the original order to show cause is 
equally without merit. As the court pointed out in 
Midwest Supply, Inc., v. Waters, Bl Nev. 210, 510 P.2d 
876 (1973), a fraud action, the prayer for relief does 
not limit recovery, except in a default action. As 
pointed out above, this action cannot be characterized as 
a default action in view of defendant's vigorous contest. 
Further, as defendant pointed out this is an action in 
equity and "equity has the power to render full and approp-
riate relief to all parties regardless of the specific 
prayers." Federici v. Lehman, 230 Ore. 70, 368 P.2d 611 
(1962) at 612-13. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant has failed to explain adequately why 
the result in this action should not be governed by the 
courts decisions in Cecil and Kent. In light of that 
failure, this case should be remanded to the trial court 
-7-
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for an award of back alimony and an increase in future 
alimony. 
Respectfully submitted, 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Ellen Maycock 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
and Appellant 
700 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: 521-9000 
-8-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I served two copies of the 
foregoing Reply Brief, by hand delivering the same, to 
Roger D. Sandack, Attorney for Defendant-Respondent, 
at 370 East Fifth South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, 
this /,2:-f!!.. day of November, 1976. 
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